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Abstract Although the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome has become
commonplace, infanticide is still widely rejected. Generally, there are three ways of
justifying the differentiation between abortion and infanticide: by referring to the
differences between the moral status of the fetus versus the infant, by referring to
the differences of the moral status of the act of abortion versus the act of infanticide,
or by separating the way the permissibility of abortion is justified from the way the
impermissibility of infanticide is justified. My argument is that none of these ways
justifies the abortion of fetuses diagnosed with Down syndrome while simultane-
ously rejecting infanticide. Either the justification for abortion is consistent with
infanticide, or it is implausible to justify abortion while rejecting infanticide. I
conclude the article by making some preliminary remarks about how one might
manage the situation posed by my argument.
Keywords Abortion  Infanticide  Down syndrome  Criteria of consciousness 
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Introduction
I begin with the following thought experiment. Suppose it were impossible to
diagnose fetuses with Down syndrome, such information being obtainable only after
birth. Would it then be justifiable to kill infants diagnosed with Down syndrome? I
believe that most of us intuitively would not consider such killing justifiable.1
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People with Down syndrome often apparently have a good quality of life, making
the euthanasia of infants with Down syndrome difficult to justify.2 Killing infants
who have Down syndrome for other reasons seems even more difficult to justify.
Nevertheless, screening fetuses for Down syndrome has become a common
obstetric practice in many countries [5], and as no treatment is available for the
defects detected, the screening is intended to provide information that can serve as a
basis for deciding whether or not to abort the fetus [6]. The exact termination rate is
uncertain, though it is clear that a great majority of fetuses diagnosed with Down
syndrome are aborted.3 Considering how ‘‘routinized’’ screening for Down
syndrome has become, at least in the Western world, and how high the termination
rate is when this defect is detected, I believe it is reasonable to conclude that we, in
practice, have an emerging consensus about the permissibility of aborting fetuses
with Down syndrome—although this does not mean that the practice is
uncontroversial.
Despite the widespread acceptance of such abortion, most people still
overwhelmingly reject the infanticide of those with Down syndrome (if that
diagnosis is made only after birth), raising the question of how to reconcile these
beliefs. I provide reasons for doubting that one can do so, specifically defending the
claim that the criteria invoked to distinguish between abortion and infanticide are
either unable to justify why aborting fetuses with Down syndrome is permissible
while infanticide is not or are too implausible to justify the abortion of fetuses
diagnosed with Down syndrome.
This article is structured as follows. First, I will demonstrate why the argument—
specifically with respect to consciousness and viability—advanced to justify
aborting fetuses with Down syndrome would also justify infanticide, and I will
counter some objections to this conclusion. I will then examine two other attempts
to justify aborting fetuses with Down syndrome while rejecting the permissibility of
infanticide: appeal to the significance of birth and the argument of bodily integrity
(the ‘‘Good Samaritan argument’’). I criticize both attempts by demonstrating that
they have highly implausible implications. I then turn to a third strategy for
justifying abortion while rejecting infanticide. The two abovementioned strategies
aim to identity a common ground for justifying abortion rights and differentiating
abortion and infanticide. For example, fetal viability is used to justify abortion
while, at the same time, justifying the rejection of infanticide. In contrast, the third
strategy for justifying abortion while rejecting infanticide is to find one way of
justifying abortion, and—if it turns out that this criterion cannot exclude the
permissibility of infanticide—another way of rejecting infanticide. I discuss these
attempts in the third section of the article, and defend my claim that these also fail
for the same reasons as the other two ways failed: either these ways are compatible
with infanticide or they are implausible. I end the article by summarizing my
2 The literature reports that the quality of life of people diagnosed with Down syndrome can be quite
high; see, for example, [2–4].
3 An early review of relevant published studies suggests a termination rate of 92% [7], while a more




argument and considering different options for how we might act if we grant that my
arguments are sound.
The problem of differentiating between abortion of fetuses with Down
syndrome and infanticide
Perhaps the most obvious way of arguing that abortion is permissible while
infanticide is not is by considering the differences between fetuses and infants.
However, because fetuses with Down syndrome are aborted quite late in
pregnancy,4 the differences are limited. Nevertheless, several have been proposed
in the literature and I think one can categorize them as follows: first, criteria related
to the existence of consciousness (e.g., desires and sentience), the criterion of
viability, and the criterion of birth.5 According to these criteria, fetuses aborted due
to Down syndrome lack consciousness and, therefore, also desires and sentience;
they would not survive outside the mother’s womb and have not yet been born.
While these differences constitute potential grounds for justifying abortion while
rejecting infanticide, I will argue that all but the last criterion—that of birth—are
unsuccessful because they are inconsistent with a principled rejection of the moral
permissibility of infanticide. In contrast, though the criterion of birth is indeed
consistent with the principled rejection of infanticide, it should be rejected as well
because it is highly implausible, which I hope to demonstrate in the third section
below.
I will start by considering criteria related to the existence of consciousness and
then turn to the criterion of viability in order to demonstrate why these criteria are
compatible with the moral permissibility of infanticide. The criteria related to
consciousness do not exclude infanticide simply because an infant can be born
without having been conscious at earlier stages. In fact, Professor Hugo Lagercrantz
concludes that, generally, ‘‘extremely preterm infants born before 25 weeks are
probably not conscious at birth’’—which of course supports my claim, although it is
sufficient to demonstrate that an infant ‘‘can’’ be born without having been
conscious at a previous stage [14, p. 304]. Moreover, Lagercrantz states that these
preterm infants do not ‘‘wake up and show signs of consciousness’’ [14, p. 304]. The
4 According to Hume and Chasen [9], the median age at prenatal diagnosis in the US (2012-2014) was
12 weeks.
5 This selection, which is based on my review of the literature, excludes certain alternative criteria. Two
currently fairly unpopular such views are ‘‘quickening’’ (see, for example, [10]) and delayed hominization
(see, for example, [11]). As these views are less often defended than those discussed above, I offer no full
refutation of them, but I believe that some of the arguments against the consciousness-based criteria are
relevant also in relation to them (see below). One might also object that the gradualist position should be
included in my selection. According to this position, the moral status of the fetus increases over the course
of pregnancy (see, for example, [12]). However, the gradualist position does not by itself define when
abortion is impermissible and is therefore not offering any specific distinction between fetuses and infants
that potentially could justify aborting fetuses with Down syndrome while rejecting infanticide (cf. [13]).
My claim is thus that proponents of the gradualist position are, if they want to justify aborting fetuses with
Down syndrome, ultimately restricted to choosing among specific criteria of which those selected here are
the most important.
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possibility of infants being born without having been conscious means that they also
can be born without having been sentient or having had desires.
One might try to defend criteria based on the existence of consciousness while
still holding that infanticide is wrong by arguing that one cannot know for sure that
the fetus lacks consciousness before birth. This is in fact how David Boonin defends
his criterion based on organized cortical activity. Boonin concludes that conscious
desires, which he maintains are the basis of a right to life, ‘‘occur at some point from
25 to 32 weeks after fertilization’’; he nevertheless proposes that adopting a more
conservative position ‘‘seems advisable given our lack of definitive knowledge’’
[15, p. 128]. By adopting such a conservative position, which would rule out the
possibility that preterm-born fetuses could survive outside the womb, abortion could
be justified while infanticide is rejected. Abortion would then be morally permitted
up to 20 weeks of gestation and thereafter be impermissible due to the mere risk of
fetuses exhibiting some kind of consciousness.
Some support for this position is provided in the medical literature. Here is how
two scientists put it, when commenting on the emergence of fetal consciousness:
If we are to accept that by approximately 20 weeks the requisite neural
substrate of consciousness (e.g., the thalamus and associated subcortical
structures) and its proper connections are in place and accompanied by a
coordinating EEG rhythm (even if only intermittently), what can we say about
the beginning moments of fetal consciousness? Again, it would seem that we
can conclude that consciousness is at least possible from this point forward in
fetal development. [16, p. 87]
These scientists do not rule out the possibility that consciousness might emerge only
after 20 weeks of gestation, a position that might be considered in line with
Boonin’s conservative position. However, it is one thing to justify the mere
possibility of consciousness but quite another to justify the position that this mere
possibility should be ascribed such moral importance as to constitute a right to life,
which in turn would determine the moral permissibility of infanticide. Conse-
quently, not only is consciousness at this fetal stage empirically uncertain, it is also
uncertain what ethical relevance such consciousness should then be ascribed (see
[17, 18]).
In this regard, one must distinguish between at least two kinds of consciousness:
The first is ‘‘consciousness as the waking state’’ and the second is
‘‘consciousness as experience.’’ Consciousness in the first sense is the
behavioral expression of the waking state. Being conscious in that sense is
synonymous to being alert and awake. The second sense of consciousness,
however, refers to becoming aware of something and to experiencing
something, which is often called ‘‘phenomenal consciousness.’’ [17, p. 88]
As the thalamocortical connections must be established before fetuses can be
conscious in the latter sense, and as this happens no earlier than after 25 gestational
weeks, Boonin and other proponents of consciousness-based criteria must justify
why the mere possibility of consciousness in the former sense constitutes a right to
life. So far that has not been done; indeed, the fact that Boonin invokes organized
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cortical activity as the criterion for when the fetus can be ascribed a right to life
implies that he rejects such a position.
However, for the sake of argument, I set aside this objection and assume that one
can justify the position that the mere possibility of some kind of consciousness
constitutes a right to life as early as in week 20. Such a position would still not rule
out the moral permissibility of infanticide according to criteria based on the
existence of consciousness. This is so because one can eliminate this uncertainty
about whether or not fetuses in week 20 are conscious by artificially suppressing the
emergence of fetal wakefulness altogether.6 For example, one could anaesthetize the
fetus and thereby prevent it from waking up at all.7 It would then be permissible to
kill the infant once it has been delivered according to criteria based on the existence
of consciousness.8 Such a procedure would certainly be feasible using current
medical technology.
Admittedly, my argument here suggests that we gain certainty about the lack of
fetal consciousness only by artificial means, which would pave the way for
justifying infanticide. Does not this fact undermine the argument? I do not think so:
the fact that the emergence of consciousness is prevented by artificial means is not,
as I see it, decisive. Many ethical dilemmas arise due to our use of new technology.
6 It is important also to note that uncertainties about whether the fetus can experience sensations or
desires are eliminated if the fetus is anesthetized. Although recent research suggests that it is possible to
have ‘‘perceptions without awareness,’’ that would still require that the one perceiving not be asleep in a
way that an anesthetized fetus would be (cf. [19]). Rather, anesthetization is known to prevent sensations
such as pain. Moreover, although it is likewise possible to have an ‘‘unconscious desire,’’ for example, to
live while one is asleep, that does not apply to fetuses anesthetized early in pregnancy because a fetus
cannot have an unconscious desire unless it has once had some kind of desire (cf. [15, p. 126]). By
anesthetizing the fetus before the capacity for having desires arises, the possibility of unconscious desires
is consequently eliminated.
7 As the fetus can be the subject of medical interventions such as open surgery, which might generate
fetal pain, medical procedures are available to anaesthetize the fetus (see [20, 21]).
8 I would argue that proponents of quickening and delayed hominization theory are also vulnerable to
this objection—granted that they offer criteria that aim to justify the abortion of fetuses with Down
syndrome. Like accounts based on consciousness, the criterion of quickening as well as of delayed
hominization that are invoked to justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome seem to depend on
the assumption that the fetus is awake. Most naturally, a fetus which is not awake does not move in a way
that is necessary for ‘‘quickening.’’ Therefore the criterion of quickening is dependent on the assumption
that the fetus is awake. And since this criterion does not provide a justification for why it would be
impermissible to prevent wakefulness through, for example, anesthetization of the fetus, an account based
on the criterion of quickening is vulnerable to the same objection as consciousness-based criteria. In an
admittedly less obvious way, an account based on a criterion of delayed hominization that aims to justify
abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome also seems vulnerable to this objection. According to this theory,
fetuses are ensouled once there is a biological capacity to receive the soul. This usually means that the
brain must be sufficiently developed in order to produce rudimentary manifestation of a rational soul with
intellect and will. As one of the leading contemporary proponents of this view puts it: ‘‘having a soul of
certain sort requires having the actual powers associated with that soul…’’ [11, p. 529]. But a fetus that is
not awake cannot have ‘‘the actual powers’’—for example ‘‘higher level thoughts’’—which are associated
with a rational soul. Neither can a fetus which is not awake be spiritually active—which is claimed to be
another condition for ensoulment according this account [22, p. 83]. Consequently it seems like
anesthetization of the fetus—by which the fetus is prevented from being wakeful—would simply be
another obstacle for the ensoulment of the fetus, just as an undeveloped brain constitutes an obstacle for
ensoulment according to this view. Accordingly, an account based on delayed hominization is also
vulnerable to the objection above.
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For example, it is only because it is possible to save extremely preterm fetuses using
advanced medical technology that the question arises about whether the infanticide
of fetuses without cortical cortexes is permissible.
A similar objection would question the permissibility of anaesthetizing fetuses by
drawing on the distinctions between allowing and doing or the principle of double
effect. By anaesthetizing the fetus in order to be able to kill the infant, you actively
and intentionally pursue an action which might eventually result in harm for the
infant (who might be killed). Would that not be impermissible? Certainly, that
might be true, though not according to consciousness-based criteria. The fetus lacks
a right to life as long as it lacks consciousness, which is why abortion is permissible
according to such criteria up to, at least, week 20. If it is permissible to actively and
intentionally eliminate the fetus by abortion up to week 20 according to these
criteria, then it is arguably also permissible to anaesthetize it actively and
intentionally since the latter causes less harm than the former. Therefore, this
objection to my argument against invoking precautionary concerns in order to
differentiate between abortion before week 20 and the infanticide of extremely
preterm fetuses without a functioning cortical cortex also fails.
Even if it were both feasible and permissible to render a fetus unconscious by
artificial means once it has been born in order to be permitted to kill it, what would
be the point? Why would a woman choose to deliver an anaesthetized fetus? To
establish that such an action would be rational is unnecessary for defending my
main thesis in this section, namely, that consciousness-based criteria are compatible
with infanticide. Nevertheless, it would strengthen my case if one could demonstrate
that it would be rational under some circumstances to act in such a way, and I
believe there are such circumstances. For example, if some birth defects cannot be
detected when the fetus is in the womb, or if such detection is highly risky when the
fetus is in the womb, then it might be rational to keep the fetus unconscious until
delivery in order to be permitted to choose whether or not to kill the infant.
That the parents should have such a right has recently been defended by Alberto
Giubilini and Francesca Minerva [23], labeling it, oxymoronically, ‘‘after-birth
abortion.’’ According to them, the fact that some pathologies are likely to remain
undetected until delivery makes it urgent to address the question of whether it is
morally permissible to kill infants born with such pathologies. Especially relevant to
my argument is how they present their case for the after-birth abortion of infants
with Down syndrome:
An examination of 18 European registries reveals that between 2005 and 2009
only 64% of Down syndrome cases were diagnosed through prenatal testing.
This percentage indicates that, considering only the European areas under
examination, about 1700 infants were born with Down syndrome without
parents being aware of it before birth. Once these children are born, there is no
choice for the parents but to keep the child, which sometimes is exactly what
they would not have done if the disease had been diagnosed before birth. [23,
p. 261]
Giubilini and Minerva do not accept the consciousness-based criteria for differen-
tiating between abortion and infanticide; rather, they argue that infanticide should
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be accepted if abortion is, as a matter of consistency. Their article illustrates,
however, that there are intelligible claims for permitting infanticide because some
defects are not detectable during pregnancy. By anaesthetizing the fetus, such an
action would be permissible under criteria based on the existence of consciousness.
Viability is another criterion that can be invoked to defend abortion while
rejecting infanticide. Viability as a criterion of fetal status means that the fetus is
able to survive outside the womb. According to the criterion in this version, it is
permissible to abort a pre-viable fetus because it is only after viability that the fetus
is considered a person entitled to a moral right to life. Historically, fetal viability has
tended to occur increasingly early in the pregnancy as an effect of technological
developments. At present, it is possible for fetuses to survive outside the womb after
22–23 weeks of gestation. The inability of the fetus to survive outside the womb
makes abortion permissible, according to this version of the viability criterion, while
still holding that infanticide is impermissible given that it would involve the killing
of a viable infant.
One common objection to this version of the viability criterion is that it is
implausible that a human being’s possession of rights should be dependent on the
development of technology. As medical technology develops, fetuses become viable
earlier in pregnancy, implying that the basic rights of the human being have
successively changed during the course of history. Given this implication, it seems
reasonable to ask, rhetorically, as William Cooney does, ‘‘[can] personhood be a
condition relative to and dependent on technology?’’ [24, p. 161]. There have been a
few attempts to defend this criterion, but as many commentators have noted,
implausible implications seem inevitably to undermine it. For example, according to
this criterion, a conjoined twin whose survival is dependent on being connected to
the other twin would not have full moral status as a human [25, p. 51; 26, p. 25; 27,
p. 438]. I believe that such a conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum argument against
this criterion.
However, for the purpose of this article, it is unnecessary to accept this
conclusion, because applying the criterion of viability in the case of conjoined twins
illustrates a more trivial and less controversial conclusion: the criterion of viability
cannot rule out the permissibility of killing a conjoined twin who is dependent on
the other twin. Indeed, as the twin whose survival is dependent on being connected
to the other twin is not viable, it has no right to life and can be killed on the same
grounds on which an unviable fetus can be aborted. Consequently, neither viability
criterion nor the other consciousness-based criteria can simultaneously justify both
the permissibility of abortion and the impermissibility of infanticide.9
9 This conclusion is certainly relevant even to cases in which fetuses do not have Down syndrome. As
long as the fetus has not been diagnosed with injuries severe enough that killing it after birth could
potentially be justified from the point of view of their best interest, this conclusion is valid. However,
given that a very small percentage of abortions is performed late in pregnancy, and given that fetuses with
Down syndrome are seldom diagnosed before week 12, even as a very high percentage of fetuses
diagnosed with Down syndrome are aborted, I believe that this category of late abortions is of special
interest. I have therefore focused on this kind of abortion even though my conclusions have a wider scope
of relevance.
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So far, I have demonstrated that consciousness-based criteria and the criterion of
viability are compatible with infanticide, which means that one cannot reject
infanticide while holding that abortion is permissible based on these criteria.
Admittedly, the circumstances in which infanticide is permissible according to these
criteria are rare. This is particularly the case when it comes to viability; according to
this criterion, only conjoined twins dependent on the other twin can permissibly be
killed. Still, the mere fact that these criteria are compatible with infanticide under
certain rare circumstances undermines the position that aborting fetuses with Down
syndrome is permissible and infanticide impermissible. That is so because, from the
point of view of these criteria, there is no ethically relevant difference between an
extremely preterm infant without a functioning cortical cortex and a conjoined
infant dependent on the other twin, on one hand, and a fetus just diagnosed with
Down syndrome, on the other. Abortion criteria based on consciousness or viability
cannot consequently rule out the permissibility of infanticide.
Why the criterion of birth and the argument from bodily integrity
cannot justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome
So far, I have argued against reconciling the beliefs that aborting fetuses with Down
syndrome is permissible while infanticide is not by demonstrating that the criteria
invoked to justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome—those based on
consciousness or viability—are, in fact, consistent with the permissibility of
infanticide. In other words, one cannot use these criteria to differentiate between
abortion and infanticide because they permit both actions. However, two other
criteria are able to differentiate between abortion and infanticide, namely, the
criterion of birth and the argument of bodily integrity (or the Good Samaritan
argument). Still, as I hope to demonstrate here, neither criterion can justify the
abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome due to its implausible implications. I will
start by discussing the criterion of birth, followed by the Good Samaritan argument.
When the criterion of birth is applied, abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome
and infanticide are differentiated by referring to the fact that the infant has been
born while the fetus is still in the womb. This criterion is also problematic, however,
because differentiating between the fetus and the infant based solely on where they
are located seems unjustifiable.10 Robert Wennerberg nicely summarizes this
criticism: ‘‘Surely personhood and the right to life is not a matter of location. It
should be what you are, not where you are that determines whether you have a right
to life’’ [29, p. 98] (emphasis in the original). Second, suppose that the infant being
outside the womb is sufficient to indicate that infanticide is impermissible. The
following thought experiment can be conducted. There is just enough of a life-
10 See, for example, [23, 27]. One can certainly claim that it is not the difference in location per se that
matters but, more specifically, the fact that the fetus is located in a woman’s womb while the infant is not
(see, for example, [28]). However, by this line of reasoning, it is not birth per se that matters; rather, the
defense of abortion with reference to the birth criterion instead collapses into the defense of abortion with




saving substance to save either an embryo in vitro or a fetus just about to be born,
but not both. We would then be obliged, according to this view, to give the
substance to the embryo rather than to the fetus because the embryo is located
outside the womb. That would indeed be implausible, not because it would be
implausible to save the embryo, but because it would be implausible to choose the
embryo over the fetus just about to be born simply because of the former’s location.
This implication demonstrates the implausibility of this criterion and why it should
be rejected as a criterion for abortion in general.11
A way to avoid this implication is to say that being outside the womb is not a
sufficient but only a necessary criterion for being entitled to a right to life. The
entity outside the womb must also meet other criteria in order to be entitled to a
right to life. However, such a defense undercuts the justification based on the
differentiation between a fetus and an infant due to location, as other criteria must
be considered to determine the impermissibility of infanticide. If these other criteria
are absent, then the criterion of birth is insufficient to justify the permissibility of
abortion while rejecting the permissibility of infanticide. Consequently, the criterion
of birth cannot then justify why it is permissible to abort fetuses with Down
syndrome but impermissible to conduct infanticide.
Faced with the failure to justify the differentiation between abortion and
infanticide by referring to differences between the moral status of the fetus and the
infant, one might turn to the moral difference between the act of abortion and the act
of infanticide. According to this argument, there is no difference between the moral
status of the fetus and the infant; on the contrary, both entities are assumed to have a
right to life. Instead, it is the fact that the fetus, unlike the infant, is dependent on the
woman’s life-sustaining assistance that potentially provides a justification for
aborting fetuses with Down syndrome while rejecting infanticide. It is argued that,
as the woman has no obligation to maintain her life-sustaining treatment, it is
permissible to terminate the pregnancy by abortion without violating the rights of
the fetus (as long as it is non-viable), while such an action is not available after
birth. This line of argument is sometimes called the good Samaritan argument
(hereafter, GS argument) for the permissibility of abortion, as it claims that
requiring the woman to refrain from abortion would be like requiring her to act as a
good Samaritan, which is an unjustifiable demand.
Proponents of the GS argument claim that abortion is permissible even if the
fetus is assumed to be a person. This position is defended by the use of a well-
known analogy about a violinist who depends on another in order to survive. The
philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson applied this analogy to the GS argument when
it was introduced in 1971. Here is how it goes:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an
unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to
have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all
the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood
type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s
11 For a similar line of argument, see [30, p. 31].
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circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to
extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the
hospital now tells you, ‘‘Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did
this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they
did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to
kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have
recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.’’ [31,
pp. 48–49]
Thomson argues that it would be permissible for you to unplug yourself from the
violinist even though this act would lead to the death of the violinist. Similarly,
Thompson thinks that a woman has the right to abort a fetus even though one
assumes, for the sake of argument, that it would lead to the death of another person
since the aim would be to avoid the burden of pregnancy rather than to kill the fetus.
Moreover, as this reason cannot be invoked in order to justify infanticide, this
argument claims to be able to differentiate between abortion and infanticide.12
This defense of the permissibility of abortion is very controversial. One of its
most prominent defenders, David Boonin, concludes that even though many believe
it to be ingenious, most still consider it flawed.13 However, to make my argument
against the permissibility of aborting fetuses with Down syndrome as strong as
possible, I will disregard such criticism and merely assume that the violinist case is
sufficiently analogous to a pregnancy and demonstrate that, even so, the abortion of
fetuses with Down syndrome would still be impermissible.
Down syndrome is detectable by tests that can be conducted as soon as the end of
the first or the beginning of the second trimester [34]. This implies that information
about the fetus having Down syndrome is always preceded by information about the
pregnancy and that one can therefore assume that it is not the information about the
pregnancy that leads to the decision to abort, but rather, the later information about
Down syndrome. Moreover, the fact that a fetus has Down syndrome does not in
itself generate an extra burden during pregnancy; rather, the extra burden is
expected to occur after birth.14
To test whether an abortion under these circumstances would be permissible, I
must adjust Thomson’s thought experiment about the violinist. Given that the
information about the fetus having Down syndrome is preceded by the information
about the pregnancy, I assume that an individual decides to maintain her life-
supporting assistance when she realizes that she is connected to the violinist, but
that she changes her mind after being informed about the status of the violinist. To
be as analogous as possible to the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome, I
assume that the reason she decided to stay connected to the violinist in the first place
12 For a recent defense of abortion rights based on this line of reasoning, see [32, 33].
13 Indeed, the organization of Boonin’s rigorous defense of this argument in A Defense of Abortion
suggests that this argument has been criticized in no fewer than 16 ways; see [15, ch. 4].
14 Certainly worries about the future of the child might afflict the future parents during a pregnancy with
a Down syndrome diagnosis more than during a pregnancy without this diagnosis. However, such worries
are still about the consequences of the diagnosis and the possible physiological sequelae for the parents
(and the rest of the family) after birth.
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was that she expected the future existence of the violinist to be more beneficial than
burdensome to herself. However, when the violinist is examined three months after
she is first connected, it is suggested that the future existence of the violinist would
burden her more than it would benefit her. She changes her mind and she
disconnects herself.
Now, the decisive question is whether it would be permissible for the individual
to disconnect herself from the violinist once she realizes that his future existence
will be burdensome to her. The burden of the pregnancy is not the only reason she
unplugs herself since she seems to have initially accepted—at least temporarily—
the arrangement, as she did not disconnect herself from him until the examination of
the violinist three months later. The aim of avoiding the burden of being connected
is not consequently sufficient for the decision to disconnect herself; without the
information about the violinist being a future burden to her, the disconnection would
not have taken place. What does that say about the intention of the disconnection in
that circumstance?
It could be that the individual aims to eliminate the existence of the violinist
simply because he would be a burden to her if he survived. In that case, a
disconnection would obviously be morally impermissible. To illustrate this point,
one might assume that she actually enjoyed being connected to the violinist, but
once she realized that the violinist would be a burden to her in the future, she
decided to disconnect herself in order to eliminate the existence of the violinist. The
only aim of her action would consequently be to secure the death of the violinist. If
the intention of an action is morally relevant, then surely such an intention makes
the disconnection morally impermissible. Rather than being an unfortunate side
effect, the death of the violinist is then an intentional effect. This distinction is also
endorsed by proponents of Thomson’s argument as they usually emphasize that the
mother’s right to terminate life-sustaining treatment is not a right to ‘‘kill the fetus
per se’’ but rather the right ‘‘to decide she does not want to use her body to sustain
the fetus’s life’’ [33, p. 334] (see also [13; 15, p. 219]). And indeed, as I show below,
proponents of the GS argument need to adhere to this view—according to which the
moral status of an action is affected by the intention—in order for their argument to
work.
More realistically, however, the individual’s aim in disconnecting after realizing
that the violinist may become a burden to her is not solely to eliminate the existence
of the violinist but also to avoid the burden of being connected for a couple of
months. For sure, avoiding these inconveniences was not a sufficient reason for
disconnection. As long as she did not know that the violinist would be a burden to
her in the future, she agreed to stay connected, but once she realized that he would
be a burden, she concluded that it was not worth staying connected to him. Is that
morally impermissible as well?
I believe so. As long as the intention to secure the death of the violinist is an
essential element of the decision to disconnect oneself, I believe that the decision
would be impermissible. Drawing on Boonin [15, p. 218], an essential element of an
action can be identified by answering the following counterfactual question: would
the individual have disconnected herself if she then would secure the death of the
violinist? And the answer here is obviously ‘‘no’’ since she agreed to stay connected
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as long as she remained unaware about the fact that the violinist would be a burden
to her. That demonstrates how essential the intention to bring the morally bad
outcome in terms of securing the death of the violist is for her decision to unplug
herself; securing the death of the violinist is therefore also an intentional act rather
than a side effect of her act to disconnect in this case. Granting that this case is
sufficiently analogous to the situation in which a fetus has been diagnosed with
Down syndrome—which, for instance, means that it is assumed that the fetus has a
right to life—and given that it is impermissible to intentionally secure the death of
the violinist, the conclusion follows that abortion in that case would be
impermissible.
This conclusion, however, clearly depends on the distinction between intended
and foreseen effects of an action defended by the principle of double effect. Another
way to object to my conclusion above—and to defend abortion of fetuses with
Down syndrome—is to reject the moral relevance of this distinction. Does the
intention of the action really matter as long as the action is the same? I believe that
this distinction is well founded, but it is neither feasible nor necessary for my
present purposes to defend this position since it is obvious that the GS argument
itself is dependent on the justification of that distinction in order to differentiate
between abortion and infanticide. This is so because if it were permissible to abort a
fetus diagnosed with Down syndrome merely in order to ensure the death of the
fetus—as it would be in the first case, where the individual chooses abortion despite
the fact that she actually enjoined being pregnant—then it seems hard to defend the
position that it would be necessarily impermissible to kill an infant diagnosed with
Down syndrome.
In both cases, the proponents of the GS argument assume that human persons are
being killed. Moreover, while the pregnant woman actually enjoined being
pregnant, the parents who realize that their infant has Down syndrome experience
the situation as being very burdensome. Why would it be morally permissible in that
situation to abort the fetus, but not to kill the infant? I do not see that the GS
argument can provide any answer to that question; the mere fact that one human
person is located within a womb while another person is outside the womb does not
seem sufficiently plausible. Rather it is the difference with regard to the moral status
of the actions that address the burden of (unwanted) pregnancies and of (unwanted)
infants respectively that generally justifies the differentiation between abortion and
infanticide, and that difference is due to the intentions of the acts. Therefore,
proponents of the GS argument must differentiate between the moral status of
abortion and infanticide by invoking the distinction between actions with foreseen
effects (like avoiding the burden of being pregnant) and intentional effects (like
infanticide). However, this argument implies that abortion with the intention of
ensuring the death of the fetus—as the one I referred to above—is impermissible,
which means that abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome is generally not
permissible as they involve an intention to ensure the death of the fetus.
Consequently, the GS argument cannot be invoked to justify the permissibility of
aborting fetuses with Down syndrome. This is not primarily because this argument
is unable to differentiate between the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome and
the killing of infants with Down syndrome, as is the case, as I have argued, with
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criteria based on consciousness and viability. On the contrary, the most plausible
version of the GS argument can differentiate between the abortion of fetuses with
Down syndrome and infanticide. The reason why the GS argument cannot be used
to justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome is rather that such an action
would be impermissible under the premises of its own argument.
Differentiating abortion and infanticide by external criteria
So far, I have focused on different ways of trying to justify abortion that do not lead
to the conclusion that infanticide might also be permissible. This strategy, if it had
worked, would have been the most robust way of defending abortion rights while, at
the same time, rejecting the permissibility of infanticide. It would have provided a
way to both justify abortion rights while differentiating between abortion and
infanticide. To illustrate, with consciousness, the fetus’s lack of consciousness
explains why abortion is permissible while the existence of consciousness of the
infant explains why infanticide is impermissible. My claim is, however, that this
attempt fails, as do the other ways under discussion here. Either the criteria justify
both abortion and infanticide (as is the case with the criteria of consciousness and
viability) or they are simply too implausible to justify abortion of fetuses with Down
syndrome (as is the case with the criteria of birth and the GS argument).
Faced with this result, another strategy may be to abandon the aim of finding a
way to simultaneously justify both abortion and its differentiation from infanticide.
Instead, one might try to settle on the most plausible way of justifying abortion, and
if that justification leads to the conclusion that infanticide is also permissible under
certain circumstances, then seek other external parameters to differentiate
infanticide from abortion. By external parameters, I mean parameters that are not
related to the justification for abortion.15 For example, one might hold on to the
criterion of consciousness as a way of justifying abortion while accepting the claim
that this criterion does not rule out infanticide. Then, in order to rule out infanticide,
one might instead invoke other differences between unconscious fetuses and infants
that justify a differentiation between abortion and infanticide. One such difference
that has previously been invoked is the possibility of giving up an infant for
adoption [35, p. 20; 36, p. 29; 37]. If there are persons ready to adopt the child once
it is born, then it is possible to avoid the burden of being a parent without killing the
infant. In contrast, a fetus as such cannot be adopted before it is born, which means
that there is a difference between abortion and infanticide with regard to adoption.
There are, of course, other differences, but I will start by discussing adoption, and
then make some general claims about this strategy to justify a differentiation
between abortion and infanticide by invoking external parameters.
One immediate response to this line of thought is to claim that, if it is granted that
adoption is available, adoption is not only an alternative to infanticide but also a
15 This distinction draws on Mary Ann Warren’s distinction between intrinsic and relational properties as
a theoretical basis for rights [28]. However, external parameters are a wider category that includes not
only relational properties but also other parameters.
Clashes of consensus: on the problem of both justifying…
123
potential alternative to abortion. Admittedly, adoption can only be implemented
after delivery, but this mere difference in timeline does not invalidate adoption as an
alternative to abortion, granted that adoption is considered to be an alternative to
infanticide. It would be more reasonable to suggest that it is the burden of being
forced to give birth before adoption that differentiates abortion and infanticide.
Since adoption as an alternative to abortion requires that the baby is born, while
adoption as an alternative to infanticide does not, this difference might justify why
abortion is permissible while infanticide is not. Consequently, it is the burden of
being forced to give birth to the baby before she or he can be given up for adoption
that justifies abortion but not infanticide.
The differences with regard to the magnitude of burden that the implementation
of adoption requires does not, however, seem to provide a general justification for
differentiating abortion from infanticide. Firstly, it depends on whether the baby can
be given up for adoption—if no one is ready to adopt the child (and no other way
exists to avoid parenthood once the child is born), then, of course, there would be no
difference between abortion and infanticide in this regard. Secondly, it is
conceivable that allowing abortion but not the infanticide of infants with Down
syndrome imposes a greater burden than allowing infanticide while not allowing
abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome—despite the fact that adoption might be
viewed as a less costly alternative to infanticide than to abortion.
To illustrate this, imagine a situation in which abortion, infanticide, as well as
adoption are allowed. Consequently, in order to avoid becoming a parent to a child
with Down syndrome, one can eliminate the fetus by abortion, kill the infant, or give
the infant up for adoption. The question is whether it would be necessarily more
burdensome to outlaw abortion rather than infanticide merely because adoption is a
less costly alternative to infanticide than abortion. The proponents of this argument
need to justify an affirmative answer to this question in order to defend the
differentiation between abortion and infanticide, and I do not think that they can
accomplish this.
Even if most people were to consider outlawing abortion to be more burdensome
than outlawing infanticide, it is not implausible to believe that some will think
otherwise. Remember that those seeking to abort a fetus with Down syndrome have
initially accepted the burden of pregnancy—given that they decide to abort the fetus
only after it is found to have Down syndrome. Consequently, some might think that
the pregnancy itself is not the primary problem and therefore not very
burdensome—even though this category would probably constitute a minority
since it seems reasonable to assume that most women would consider it to be
burdensome to give birth to a child merely to give it up for adoption. Nonetheless,
for some, the burden of pregnancy might be quite manageable; their central aim,
rather, may be to avoid becoming a parent to a child with Down syndrome by
extinguishing the offspring.16 Granted that this is the aim, adoption is not an
alternative to either infanticide or abortion, which in turn means that adoption
16 This view is endorsed by some feminists. For example, the political scientist Sarah Langford
emphasizes that the aim of an abortion is sometimes to ‘‘prevent the existence of their biological children
and thus prevent motherhood’’ [38, p. 267]. Boonin also acknowledges that this can be an aim with
abortion; see [15, p. 221].
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cannot provide the general justificatory basis for differentiating abortion from
infanticide.
Moreover, as I mentioned above, there may be reasons—as the philosophers
Giubilini and Minerva have claimed—to opt for infanticide rather than abortion as
the latter implies a certain risk that a healthy fetus is eliminated while this risk can
be ruled out in case of infanticide [23]. Therefore, if the aim is to avoid becoming a
parent of a child with Down syndrome by extinguishing it, infanticide is safer than
abortion. Now, one can certainly question the legitimacy of choosing to kill the
infant rather than to give it up for adoption—and I will do that later on—but that is
not at issue here.17 Rather, my aim has been to demonstrate that it is not necessarily
more burdensome to outlaw abortion rather than infanticide merely because
adoption generally is a less costly alternative to the latter compared to the former
since adoption might be irrelevant as an alternative. Therefore, the criterion of
adoption cannot generally justify why abortion is permissible while infanticide is
not.
There are, of course, other external differences between abortion and infanticide
situations that can be invoked to justify a differentiation between these two actions.
For example, in the latter situation, there is commonly both a father and a mother
equally affected by the situation, while the mother is clearly more affected in the
former situation [35]. However, this difference—like others of an external nature, I
dare to claim—does not categorically rule out the permissibility of infanticide since
it is a contingent difference. Consequently, if, for example, egg donations are
permitted by anonymous donors, there may be cases where only the mother is left to
decide whether or not the infant should be killed, which, in turn, eliminates this
difference between the cases and makes infanticide permissible according to this
criterion.
Once one fails to find a criterion that justifies abortion in a way that rules out the
permissibility of infanticide, it seems difficult to identify other parameters that could
justify a general rejection of infanticide. Recall that some of the previously
discussed parameters are too implausible—i.e., the criterion of birth and the GS
argument—and there are, of course, other differences that are even more obviously
implausible. For example, an infant can be observed with the naked eye while the
fetus can only be observed by ultrasound, but to invoke this difference as a
17 This could, of course, be questioned, since one might defend the argument for adoption against
infanticide by arguing against the legitimacy of aiming to eliminate one’s offspring by abortion. If that
could be achieved, then adoption would be a more appropriate alternative to infanticide than abortion
(since the latter but not the former can be justified due to the aim of avoiding the burden of pregnancy),
which in turn, might justify the differentiation between abortion and infanticide. However, abortion
proponents must identify a way that justifies the rejection of the permissibility of the aim to eliminate the
infant or the fetus—rather than solely to avoid parenthood—that does not restrict the abortion rights based
on either consciousness-based criteria or viability, and that seems hard to achieve. For example, one can,
of course, decide not to invoke the right to life of fetus as a reason why the aim to eliminate it would be
impermissible, since that would restrict abortion rights. More generally, the problem can be formulated in
the following way: once one has accepted that reasons can override the reasons for the permissibility of
infanticide other than those based on criteria related to consciousness or viability, then it seems, out of
consistency, that one also must accept that other reasons can override the reasons for the permissibility of
abortion based on these criteria. If this conclusion is correct, then this way of defending abortion while
rejecting infanticide also is not successful in the end.
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justification for why infanticide is impermissible but abortion is not seems highly
implausible. Other parameters fail because they are contingent and therefore can be
arranged in way that eliminates the difference between abortion and infanticide,
which, in turn, invalidates the justification for the differentiation. In either case, one
fails to justify abortion while rejecting the permissibility of infanticide.
Concluding remarks
The overall conclusion of the present arguments is that it is difficult to morally
justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome without also permitting the
killing of infants with Down syndrome. There are at least three kinds of associated
difficulties. First, I believe that I have demonstrated that criteria based on the
existence of consciousness and the criterion of viability are compatible with
infanticide. Second, the remaining criteria for differentiating between infanticide
and abortion—the criterion of birth and the GS argument—are not sufficiently
plausible to justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome. Third, it seems
difficult to identify external criteria—i.e., parameters that are not related to the
justification of abortion—that are sufficiently plausible or cannot be arranged to
eliminate the relevant differences between abortion and infanticide situations. My
conclusion, therefore, is that it seems problematic to both justify abortion of fetuses
with Down syndrome and, at the same time, to reject the permissibility of
infanticide.
If this conclusion is correct, and if we care about how we justify our actions, what
approach should be taken toward abortion and infanticide? One option is to hold on
to consciousness-based criteria or the viability criterion to justify the abortion of
fetuses with Down syndrome, and to accept infanticide under circumstances in
which these criteria allow it. However, if so, the implications must also be
recognized, that is, fetuses can permissibly be anaesthetized in order to prevent
consciousness and then killed after they have been born and a conjoined twin—
dependent on his or her twin to survive—can permissibly be killed. Another option
is to reject these criteria and not accept the permissibility of infanticide under these
circumstances. But if my claim that the other ways of justifying the abortion of
fetuses with Down syndrome—namely, criterion of birth and the GS argument—
fail, then it follows that it is morally impermissible to abort fetuses with Down
syndrome. A third option is to accept consciousness-based criteria or viability as a
way to justify the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome and then try to find
other, external criteria to differentiate between fetuses with Down syndrome and
unconscious or non-viable infants. However, as I have tried to demonstrate, it might
be hard to find external criteria that are able to provide a general justification for the
differentiation between fetuses with Down syndrome and unconscious or non-viable
infants. Which of these three positions are the most reasonable?
While I will not be able to accomplish a full-fledged defense of my position here,
I will nevertheless provide reasons for why I believe that we should opt for the
second position. I have not argued against abortion as such in this article, nor have I
provided reasons against infanticide. Nonetheless, I believe it is plausible to
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conclude that it is at least uncertain whether it would be morally right to permit
infanticide or whether it would be morally disastrous to do so. In support of this
conclusion, one can invoke arguments in favor of the position that infants generally
have a right to life, which makes it at least plausible to fear that infanticide would
violate that right to life of the infant. Now, if infanticide were allowed, and it turned
out that infanticide actually violated a human person’s right to life, then we would
commit a gravely wrong action. Such a scenario speaks in favor of the second
option. One could, moreover, invoke the fact that it would not be very costly to
avoid making infanticide permissible. As discussed above, adoption provides an
alternative to infanticide, and as long as parenthood can be avoided by means other
than killing the fetus, such an option seems preferable to infanticide. Admittedly,
the cost of not permitting women to abort fetuses diagnosed with Down syndrome
would generally be higher—even if it cannot be ruled out, as I demonstrated above,
that it would be less costly than infanticide in some circumstances. Nonetheless, as I
mentioned above, adoption is also an option in these cases [39]. Equally, there are
plausible arguments in favor of the view that fetuses with Down syndrome also have
a right to life, which means that permitting their abortion might be gravely wrong.
Therefore, in the face of these uncertainties, there are strong reasons to opt for the
second alternative whereby both the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome and
infanticide are rejected.
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